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Abstract 
A number of papers have challenged research on physiological 
and psychological influences on perception because they claim 
to show that such findings can be explained by non-perceptual 
factors such as demand characteristics.  Relatedly, calls for 
separating “perception” from “judgment” have been issued. 
However, such efforts fail to consider key processes known to 
shape judgment processes, namely first, people’s inability to 
report accurately on their judgments, second, conversational 
dynamics of experimental research contexts, and third, 
misattribution and discounting processes.  Indeed, the fact that 
initially observed effects of embodied influences disappear is 
predicted by an extensive body of literature on judgments 
studied within social psychology.  Thus, findings from such 
studies suggest that the initially presumed underlying 
processes are at work, namely functional considerations that 
are informative in the context of preparing the body for action.  
Suggestions are provided on how to conduct research on 
perception within the social constraints of experimental 
contexts.   
 
 
We shall designate by the term perception all the 
different ways we have of getting to know the 
environment, from direct perception to explicit 
inference (Heider, 1958, p. 27). 
  
 Fritz Heider, who is widely recognized as one of the 
founding fathers of modern social psychology, studied 
fundamental questions relating to how people make 
                                                          
1 Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed 
to Simone Schnall, University of Cambridge, Department of 
Psychology, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United 
Kingdom. Email: ss877@cam.ac.uk 
 
The preparation of this paper was supported by ESRC Grant 
RES-000-22-4453. Suzanne Brink, Jerry Clore, Frank Eves, 
Dario Krpan, Sally Linkenauger, Denny Proffitt, Norbert 
Schwarz, Jeanine Stefanucci and Jessica Witt provided 
valuable comments on an earlier draft, which are greatly 
appreciated.  
 
sense of their own internal states and behaviors, and 
those of other people.  Since these early days, such 
questions have been central to the field of social 
psychology, and although significant advances have 
been made in the intervening years, some of the early 
principles identified by Heider remain valid after having 
been put to rigorous empirical tests.  One conclusion of 
decades of experimental work is that judgments of 
various kinds are shaped by social and contextual 
factors.  But rather than constituting a flaw, this 
contextually embedded nature of judgment often serves a 
functional role.  For example, the judgment effects 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (e.g., 1974), 
initially considered as “errors and biases,” were 
subsequently interpreted as adaptive inferences that are 
usually highly functional in everyday life (Gigerenzer, 
1991).   
Extensive research also shows that people incorporate 
subjective feelings when they are considered to provide 
relevant information in a given judgment context.  These 
include both affective and cognitive feelings (for 
reviews, see Clore, 1992; Schwarz, 2012).  For example, 
when feeling happy because of having received a free 
gift, people report higher satisfaction with their 
consumer products (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). 
Similarly, the good mood of having watched a cheerful 
movie leads to more positive judgments across a variety 
of domains compared to the bad mood induced by sad or 
aggressive movies (Forgas & Moylan, 1987).  Affective 
feelings thus give valuable information about one’s own 
preferences and evaluations (e.g., Clore et al., 2001).  
Cognitive feelings, by contrast, are not feelings about 
value but feelings about knowing (e.g., feelings of 
fluency, confusion, boredom, and so on).  One example 
is the experience of ease or difficulty in recalling 
judgment-relevant information.  For example, the ease 
with which examples of one’s own assertiveness are 
recalled has a greater influence on subsequent 
assertiveness judgments than the information content 
conveyed by those examples (Schwarz, et al., 1991). 
Thus, considerable evidence suggests that judgments 
take into account a variety of sources of information 
(Schwarz, 2012).   
 An equally important conclusion of this work, 
however, is that although many subjective experiences 
are used in judgment, they retain their potency only as 
long as the source of the influence is kept outside of 
participants’ conscious focus.  Experimentally, this has 
been demonstrated in misattribution paradigms (e.g., 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schnall, Abrahamson, & Laird, 
2002), in which the influence of feelings disappears 
when attention is drawn to them.  For example, people 
tend to experience more negative moods on cold and 
rainy days than on warm and sunny days. In one well-
known experiment people evaluated their life as a whole 
more positively when interviewed on warm and sunny 
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than on cold and rainy days (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
However, when the feelings about the weather were 
made salient, their influence on judgments of well-being 
vanished.  Similarly, the effects of ease of recall on 
judgments of assertiveness disappeared when 
participants were led to falsely attribute their experiences 
of ease or difficulty to incidental background music 
(Schwarz et al., 1991).  Thus, the misattribution 
paradigm has been an essential research tool in showing 
that feelings contribute to judgments, but only as long as 
their informational value is not undermined.  
In addition to research on the role of affective and 
cognitive experience in judgment, a literature has been 
emerging to indicate that perceptual judgments are 
similarly influenced by experiential and contextual 
factors. Following the “economy of action” approach 
(Proffitt, 2006), research has discovered that factors such 
as the weight of a backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999) or 
blood glucose levels (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010) 
influence perceptions of spatial layout.  However, some 
researchers (e.g., Durgin, et al. 2009; Durgin, Klein, 
Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams, 2012; Shaffer, 
McManama, Swank, & Durgin, 2013; Woods, Philbeck, 
& Danoff, 2009; see also Firestone, 2013; Firestone & 
Scholl, in press) have questioned the validity of this 
evidence by claiming that these findings are due to 
“experimental demand characteristics.”  In particular, 
they showed that previously demonstrated effects 
vanished after adding manipulations intended to separate 
perceptual from judgment processes.  For example, 
asking participants to ignore the backpack while 
estimating the incline of a hill was found to eliminate the 
influence it otherwise has on slant perception (Durgin et 
al., 2012).  This and other findings have been interpreted 
to suggest that once participants are made aware of an 
extraneous influence on their perception (e.g., the 
presence of a backpack), their actual, unmediated 
perceptual experience is exposed, which is uninfluenced 
by effort-related factors such as a backpack. Indeed, 
Firestone and Scholl (in press) claim that such findings 
are unreliable because they follow from a confirmatory 
research strategy, which they consider a “pitfall” in past 
research.  
 In this paper I argue that previously observed effects 
should disappear once key aspects of the research are 
altered, and that their disappearance indicates that the 
original effects are due to factors normally outside of 
conscious consideration.  More specifically, contextual 
and embodied influences have an effect on judgments 
only as long as participants remain unaware of this 
influence. Once they become salient, however, deliberate 
efforts are undertaken to counteract these factors, 
therefore eliminating their impact. Indeed, it has been 
well established that, first, people have little access to 
the reasons behind their internal states and have 
difficulty reporting them accurately even when 
motivated to do so.  Second, attempts to instruct 
perceivers to make “objective” judgments are subject to 
the rules of conversation (Grice, 1957) that shape how 
people answer questions in experiments.  Third, various 
critical influences on judgment processes operate only as 
long as they remain implicitly embedded in the flow of 
experience and are not made distinct by becoming the 
object of conscious attention.  These three factors will be 
elaborated to place the findings intended to differentiate 
perception from judgment into the context of classic 
findings from social psychology.  Before doing so, 
however, a brief review is provided on the research on 
embodied influences on perception, because they 
constitute the target of recent critiques. 
 
Embodied Perception 
Building on Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach, 
research following the notion of an economy of action 
assumes that perception is influenced by the perceiver’s 
capacity to navigate and act effectively in a given 
environment (Proffitt, 2006).  In order to manage one’s 
physical and mental resources to cope with the world, 
humans, and indeed all organisms, scale the world in 
terms of the actions afforded by their bodies.  Visual 
perception therefore reflects not only visual perspective, 
but also the ability to engage with aspects of the physical 
environment, given one’s bodily and psychological 
capabilities.  In this view, perception is for action and 
reflects bodily constraints regarding action plans and 
resources.  Consequently, action-related contingencies 
are also part of visual perception.  
Indeed, numerous studies have shown that 
perceivers’ potential for action changes the perception of 
spatial properties, including distance, slant, size and 
weight (for reviews, see Proffitt, 2006; 2013; Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a).  For example, when a 
person is wearing a heavy backpack, fatigued, or in poor 
health a hill slant is perceived as steeper compared to 
when no such constraints are present (Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999).  Similarly, participants throwing a heavy ball 
estimate the distance to given targets as farther than 
participants throwing a light ball because the difficulty 
of hitting the target is indicative of corresponding 
distance (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004).  Holding a 
baton that extends the reach of one’s arm makes targets 
appear closer relative to not holding such a tool (Witt, 
Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005).  After consuming glucose, 
which directly increases the body’s energetic resources, 
participants perceive a hill to be less steep (Schnall et al., 
2010), and distances to be shorter (Cole & Balcetis, 
2013) than after consuming non-caloric sweetener.  
The availability of psychosocial resources has equally 
been shown to influence perception of the physical 
world.  For example, participants in the presence of a 
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friend estimated a hill to be less steep than participants 
who were alone (Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci & Proffitt, 
2008). Men accompanied by other men perceive a 
possible opponent to be smaller than men who are alone 
(Fessler & Holbrook, 2013). Furthermore, manipulations 
of motivational states change the perception of slant 
(Balcetis & Dunning, 2007; Krpan & Schnall, 2014a), 
distance (Cole, Balcetis, & Zhang, 2013; Krpan & 
Schnall, 2014b) and speed (Witt & Sugovic, 2013).  
Negative moods make hills appear steeper than positive 
moods do (Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2011). 
The fear of falling leads to an overestimation of height 
while standing on a tall balcony and looking down to the 
ground (Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009), but reminding 
oneself about one’s positive qualities eliminates the 
effects of ego depletion on height perception (Huynh, 
Stefanucci, & Aspinwall, 2014) and of a backpack on 
distance perception (Shea & Masicampo, 2014).  All this 
evidence suggests that perception of the physical world 
is constrained by factors that are concerned with goals, 
plans, and resource considerations.   
 
“Pure” Perception versus Judgment 
A critic might contend that the processes studied 
from the economy of action (Proffit, 2006; Witt, 2011a) 
and motivated perception (Balcetis & Dunning, 2007; 
Cole, Balcetis, & Zhang, 2013) approaches reflect 
merely effects on post-perceptual judgments, rather than 
“pure” perceptual processes. Thus, it may be that the 
observed effects are qualitatively different from other, 
more low-level perceptual processes, which instead may 
be informationally encapsulated and modular (Firestone 
& Scholl, in press; Fodor, 1987; Pylyshyn, 1999).  
To address this issue various methods have been used 
that go beyond explicit self-report. For example, to show 
that the earlier finding of holding a baton makes targets 
appears closer because it extends one’s ability to reach 
them (Witt et al., 2005), Witt (2011b) used an indirect 
perceptual estimate involving triangles, based on the 
assumption that the end point of the triangle would seem 
closer, and the connecting lines of the triangle would 
appear more horizontal for participants holding a baton. 
Participants were asked to match a comparison triangle 
to a stimulus triangle. Indeed, the triangles appeared 
shorter to participants holding a baton compared to those 
without, suggesting that they perceived the top of the 
triangles to be closer, therefore replicating the earlier 
results that holding a baton expands participants’ 
subjectively experienced field of vision (Witt et al., 
2005).  
Furthermore, there is a considerable body of evidence 
to suggest that top-down processes, including current 
action goals of the perceiver, shape sensory and 
perceptual processes at a relatively low level, especially 
if they are relevant for facilitating anticipated action (for 
reviews, see Collins & Olson, 2014; Engel, Maye, 
Kurthen, König, 2013; Goldstone, de Leeuw, & Landy, 
2015). For example, although optical illusions may be 
considered to not be influenced by top-down processes, 
they depend on previous experience: The Müller-Lyer 
illusion looks different to people from different cultures 
(Segall, Campbell & Kerskovits, 1963) or after training 
(Parker & Newbigging, 1963) and the Ames room 
distortion is less pronounced when viewing persons with 
whom one has a close relationship than for strangers 
(Wittreich, 1953; Dion & Dion, 1976). The Ebbinghaus 
illusion is stronger when all objects belong to the same 
category compared to when they come from different 
categories (Coren & Enns, 1993). Color perception of 
objects is influenced by category membership 
(Goldstone, 1995) and prior knowledge about the 
expected colour (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & 
Gegenfurtner, 2006). The visual background toward 
which a grey patch is presented changes lightness 
perception (Knill & Kersten, 1991) and when a visual 
illusion makes an object appear large, a greater area of 
the primary visual cortex (V1) is activated than when it 
appears small (Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006). 
Similarly, emotional and motivational states of the 
perceiver influence perception. For example, being 
presented with fearful faces leads to heightened contrast 
sensitivity (Phelps, Ling & Carrasco, 2006) and hungry 
participants recognize food-related words more readily 
than satiated participants (Radel & Clément-Guillotin, 
2012).  
Perceptual processes also change as a function of 
experience with certain physical stimuli and associated 
learning across the life span. Already early in life 
explorative action shapes the development of the visual 
system (Held & Hein, 1963). Similarly, in adulthood 
extended exposure to certain sensory stimuli changes 
how they are perceived and processed on a neural level. 
For example, professional musicians show cortical 
reorganization of sensorimotor areas as a function of 
experience (Münte, Altenmüller & Jäncke, 2002), and 
with increased training the same brain areas that control 
motor movements involved in producing music become 
activated when merely listening to music (Bangert, 
Haeusler & Altenmüller, 2001). Thus, individual 
differences as a function of experience shape perception.  
Indeed, a growing body of evidence on what has been 
termed predictive coding suggests that past experience 
and future action goals continuously re-shape attention 
and perception at the level of neural receptive fields (for 
overviews, see Clark, 2013; Huang & Rao, 2011; Mehta, 
2001). In rodents additional place cells become active in 
the hippocampus after they traversed a specific spatial 
environment (Mehta & McNaughton, 1997), and these 
cells subsequently show anticipatory firing patterns 
when encountering this environment again (Mehta, 
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Quirk, & Wilson, 2000). Similarly, in monkeys neurons 
in the primary visual cortex become specialized as a 
function of having performed a visual discrimination 
task (Wu, Piëch & Gilbert, 2004). More generally, visual 
attention involves dynamically allocating receptive 
fields to action-relevant objects (Bundesen, Habekost, & 
Kyllingsbæk, 2005). Thus, increasing evidence suggests 
that even at the single-cell neural level, attention and 
perception are driven by factors such as motivation, 
current action goals, individual differences including 
previous learning experience and other “high-level” 
processes. As a consequence, there is little reason to 
believe that there is a process of “pure” perception that 
always takes place in the same universal, invariant 
manner. Instead, top-down processes are likely to be 
adaptive in reducing prediction errors regarding future 
actions, and sensory processes in turn feed back into 
action plans and expectations (Lupyan & Clark, in press; 
Lupyan, in press). Therefore, rather than embodied 
perception constituting a special case of a conflation of 
perceptual and judgment processes, it is likely that 
perception in general is not as modular and encapsulated 
as some (e.g., Firestone & Scholl, in press; Pylyshyn, 
1999) have proposed. An important way of examining 
the nature of judgments is to test the boundary 
conditions under which the effects occur, including the 
factors that lead to a lack of previously documented 
effects.  
 
Making the Effects Go Away 
A number of papers have been published that have 
demonstrated that the effects initially observed in studies 
conducted within the economy of action approach 
disappear when the original experimental paradigms are 
modified (Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin et al., 2012; 
Firestone & Scholl, 2013; Shaffer, McManama, Swank, 
& Durgin; 2013; Woods et al., 2009).  These studies 
purport to uncover “experimental demand” (Durgin et 
al., 2009) or “social artifacts” (Durgin et al., 2012).  The 
second part of the current paper demonstrates that such 
conclusions are unwarranted given what is known about 
judgment processes.  In general, the methods used by 
critics of the account have included first, giving 
participants specific instructions regarding how to arrive 
at their perceptual judgment, second, encouraging 
participants to revise their initial judgments, and third 
and most importantly, making highly salient or explicit 
the perceptual influences that are normally effective only 
when they remain implicit.  
  
Providing Participants With Elaborate Instructions. 
Woods, Philbeck and Danoff (2009) speculated that 
perhaps participants “adopt a response attitude that takes 
[…] nonperceptual factor into account rather than basing 
their judgments exclusively on perceived distance (p. 
1112).”  To remedy this potential problem they devised 
instructions to get at “objective” distance, by instructing 
each participant:   
Base your response on how far away you think the object 
really is. If you think that the object appears to be at a 
different distance than you think it really is or if you feel 
that the object is at a different distance (for whatever 
reason), ignore those other things, and just base your 
answer on where you think the object really is (p. 1113, 
emphasis added). 
When participants were explicitly instructed to discount 
extraneous factors potentially influencing distance 
estimates, the effect previously documented by Witt et 
al. (2004), that throwing a heavy ball leads to 
overestimation of distance relative to throwing a 
lightweight ball, was not obtained.  In contrast, when 
participants were told to “base responses on how far 
away the object is, by taking all nonvisual factors into 
account (p. 1113),” participants produced the predicted 
effect of greater distance estimates after throwing a 
heavy ball, which was interpreted to indicate that the 
original effects were due to non-perceptual factors.  
 
Asking Participants to Give Perceptual Estimates 
Several Times.  In a different attempt to get participants 
to reveal their true perceptions, participants were asked 
to provide slant estimates on several occasions (Durgin 
et al., 2012).  After giving slant estimates at a hill, either 
with or without a backpack, participants were led back to 
the lab and asked a number of questions that highlighted 
the earlier presence of the backpack, including:  
How heavy (specify in pounds or kilos) do you think  
the backpack was? 
Do you think the backpack affected your judgment of  
the steepness of the hill? 
What is the steepest possible realistic estimate that you 
think would be a reasonable estimate for that hill when 
looking at it? 
What is the shallowest possible realistic estimate for that 
hill you might consider reasonable? (p. 1593) 
After having considered all these questions participants 
were asked: “How steep do you think the hill really is?” 
(p. 1593, emphasis added).  On their first estimate 
participants who wore a backpack reported the hill to be 
steeper than those without a backpack, consistent with 
the original finding (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999).  When 
making a second slant estimate, however, participants 
who had worn a backpack gave lower slant estimates 
compared to the estimates they provided the first time, at 
the hill.    
  
Making the Influence on Perception Salient.  With 
the goal of eliminating demand effects Durgin et al. 
(2009; see also Shaffer et al., 2013) gave some of their 
participants a specific explanation of why they were 
asked to put on a backpack, namely that it ostensibly 
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contained measuring equipment required for the study.  
Elaborate instructions were used to make the presence 
and purpose of the backpack highly obvious:  
Real electrodes were then attached to their ankles with 
leads that ran into the backpack.  To enhance the illusion 
that the backpack contained working equipment, an 
electric fan inside the backpack emitted noise, and 
additional equipment was on display in the lab (including 
electrode gel, extra leads, and large batteries in the process 
of being charged)  (p. 965). 
Replicating Bhalla and Proffitt (1999), participants in the 
“regular” backpack condition gave higher slant estimates 
than participants in the no backpack condition.  
However, those participants who were given the 
additional instructions specifying the reason for wearing 
a backpack did not show an effect.  
 All these methods assume that once participants are 
given appropriate instructions, their true perceptual 
processes can be separated from inferential judgment 
biases.  Unfortunately, this logic is completely at odds 
with the larger literature on judgment processes, as will 
be reviewed next.  
 
People Do Not Always Have Introspective Access to 
the Reasons behind their Judgments 
Research on perception generally asks people to 
make judgments regarding what they perceive, and thus, 
the relevant dependent measures always tap into 
subjective experience. However, it is well-established 
that the means by which people report on their 
perceptions are not perfect reflections of internal 
experiences, because many factors influence how people 
give their responses (cf. Schwarz, 1999).  Thus, to more 
accurately assess individual experience, questions about 
perceptual judgments have to be asked in a manner that 
minimizes possible other confounds.  Indeed, decades of 
research suggest that people do not have the kind of 
access to their own thoughts and feelings assumed in 
reliance on such methods: People are often unable to 
report accurately on their internal processes, even if they 
are highly motivated to do so.  
One of the classic papers on this problem was 
entitled, “Telling more than we can know” (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977), and pointed to the fact that people’s 
reports often do not accurately reflect their internal 
processes, even if they themselves are convinced about 
being in charge of their decisions and behaviors.  For 
example, in one study, participants chose from an array 
of nylon stockings.  Ostensibly as part of a consumer test 
they indicated which pair they preferred and for what 
reason.  Unbeknownst to participants, however, all pairs 
of stockings were identical.  Although they felt confident 
that they had objective reasons for their selection, in 
reality the preponderance of choices reflected a tendency 
to prefer items appearing on the right rather than the left, 
or in the middle (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Critically, 
when asked, participants denied that position had 
anything to do with their preferences.  Thus, people 
often give reasons for their thoughts and behaviors that 
are unrelated to the real underlying reasons (for a 
review, see Wilson & Dunn, 2004). 
Thus, caution needs to be used when asking 
participants to hypothesize about the actual purpose of 
an experiment.  Indeed, in his classic paper on demand 
characteristics Orne’s (1962) noted that when 
questioning participants after the study, open-ended 
questions such as asking if they had any guess regarding 
the study goal should be used. Closed questions, on the 
other hand, such as asking participants “You didn’t 
realize that the other fellows were confederates, did 
you?” (Orne, 1962, p. 780) suggest the expected answer 
instead of capturing participants’ independent, 
spontaneous responses.  Similarly, when asked “Do you 
think the backpack affected your judgment of the 
steepness of the hill?” (Durgin et al., 2009) participants 
are likely to respond affirmatively, to show that they 
figured it out already, so as to not come across as 
ignorant or incompetent.  Although Durgin et al. (2009) 
found that when questioned, the five participants who 
reported to have thought that the backpack influenced 
their slant estimates gave higher estimates, it is not clear 
that they would have had this hypothesis regarding the 
study purpose already before having been asked that 
question. The same limitation applies to the study by 
Shaffer et al. (2013).  Perhaps a better strategy might be 
to give further indications to participant to carefully 
consider their answers, or ask them to reconsider and 
revise their initial response.  As will be reviewed next, 
such a strategy is equally unsuccessful because people 
routinely make inferences about others’ intentions that 
go well beyond the actual words uttered.  
 
Conversational Dynamics Shape People’s Answers in 
Experiments 
 When people communicate with one another they 
draw upon their own and other people’s beliefs about 
various states of the world (Grice, 1957; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995).  This shared understanding comprises the 
facts that speaker and audience acknowledge as true, 
based on those facts either having been directly 
perceived, or instead, inferred from the communicative 
context.  Indeed, a majority of communicative intent is 
not explicitly stated.  A simple example is the pragmatic 
intent of asking another person whether she knows what 
time it is, a question to which the response “yes” would 
not provide an appropriate answer.  In other words, in 
communication it is often clear that the utterance of 
certain words implies a specific goal, and people read 
between the lines to infer those goals.  Deriving 
appropriate inferences, however, can be effortful, and 
6 
communication aims to achieve the greatest possible 
communicative output while expending the smallest 
possible processing effort—namely, to communicate 
only what is relevant (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).  Thus, 
people generally only say what is necessary, and do not 
say too much or too little.   
Because they involve social interactions, in research 
contexts participants draw upon the same conversational 
principles that they apply in daily life (Clark & Schober, 
1992; Schwarz, 1994; 1996).  For example, the wording 
and context of a question substantially changes the 
answer that is provided (Schwarz, 1999; Sudman, 
Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, Rips, & 
Rasinski, 2000).  As is the case for communication in 
general, people go beyond literal meaning and make 
inferences about the intention behind the question that 
was asked. Grice’s (1957) maxim of quantity describes 
that speakers want to provide the appropriate amount of 
information without being redundant.  By using 
strategies such as asking participants the same question 
about hill slant twice (as in Durgin et al., 2012), the 
communicative intention of the experimenter is clear:  
You made a mistake when you answered the 
experimenter’s question the first time around; now you 
have a chance to try again and come up with a better 
response.  This will lead participants to infer that their 
first estimate must have been incorrect: “For example, if 
a test is given twice with some intervening treatment, 
even the dullest college student is aware that some 
change is expected, particularly if the test is in some 
obvious way related to the treatment” (Orne, 1962, p. 
779).  Indeed, participants will not repeat the same 
answers on questions that they have answered earlier, 
because they assume a different answer is required from 
the one already provided (Strack, Schwarz, & Wänke, 
1991; see also McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974).  Thus, a 
request to revise an answer implies that the initial 
answer was unsatisfactory, just as somebody saying 
“yes” to the question regarding the current time might be 
asked again to provide a proper answer.    
Factors relating to conversational dynamics are also 
relevant when giving participants specific instructions.  
For example, Woods et al. (2009) encouraged some 
participants to “take all nonvisual factors into account” 
when making their estimates and they gave higher 
estimates when throwing a heavy ball to a target 
compared to a light-weight ball.  However, telling 
participants that you want them to consciously change 
their judgment says little about the processes that occur 
spontaneously and automatically in the absence of such 
instructions.  Indeed, Orne (1962) acknowledged that 
subjects always have some implicit expectation or 
hypothesis about the study in which they are 
participating: “It should be clear that demand 
characteristics cannot be eliminated from experiments; 
all experiments will have demand characteristics, and 
these will always have some effect” (p. 779).  Thus, it is 
unlikely that by introducing new instructions (e.g., 
Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin et al., 2012; Woods et al., 
2009) potential demand characteristics can be removed.  
More likely, such attempts will create precisely the very 
demand that they intended to avoid, and therefore evoke 
processes that have little to do with perception proper.   
Importantly, the communicative processes in a social 
judgment context are very different from experimental 
demand characteristics. In his seminal paper Orne (1962) 
explicitly noted that demand characteristics, namely 
participants’ desire to serve as a “good subject,” operate 
on an unconscious level:  
If, on the other hand, the demand characteristics are so 
obvious that the subject becomes fully conscious of the 
expectations of the experimenter, there is a tendency to 
lean over backwards to be honest. We are encountering 
here the effect of another facet of the collect student’s 
attitude toward science.  While the student wants studies to 
“work,” he feels he must be honest in his report; otherwise 
erroneous conclusions will be drawn. Therefore, if the 
student becomes acutely aware of the experimenter’s 
expectations, there may be a tendency for biasing in the 
opposite direction (Orne, 1962, p. 780, emphasis added).  
Indeed, such counterintuitive effects opposite to 
experimental predictions have been obtained. For 
example, in an early experiment on conformity, 
participants who expressed suspicion about the study 
purpose showed less of a conformity effect than 
unsuspicious participants (Stricker, Messick, & Jackson, 
1967).  Similarly, when participants were tipped off by a 
fellow participant (who in reality was a confederate) 
about the study purpose, they showed the opposite of the 
predicted effect:  Their awareness ratings were 
negatively correlated with the outcome variable 
(Golding & Lichtenstein, 1967).  In line with those early 
findings, participants who realized that a sugary drink 
was intended to influence slant perception provided 
lower slant estimates (Shaffer et al., 2013).  Thus, 
awareness of an influence on one’s judgment does not 
necessarily mean that participants “play along” and 
therefore produce the predicted effect.  
One reason is that in addition to the desire to be a 
“good subject”, as Orne (1962) had suggested, there is a 
desire to come across as competent:  Participants 
experience evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969) 
because they believe their performance on the task will 
be scrutinized by the experimenter.  Such motivations 
can lead to attempts to present the self in a positive light 
(Goffman, 1959) and socially desirable responses 
(Crowne & Marlow, 1964).  Indeed, when there is a 
conflict between conforming to the assumed hypothesis 
(Orne, 1962), or coming across as competent and going 
against the hypothesis, participants tend to opt for the 
latter (Sigall, Aronson, & Van Hoose, 1970; Newberry, 
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1973; Rosnow, Goodstadt, Suls, & Gitter, 1973).  
Resulting contrast effects are common because in an 
attempt to be “unbiased”, it is difficult to know exactly 
how much to correct, resulting in overcorrection (Strack 
& Hannover, 1996; Wegener & Petty, 1997).  Thus, 
once a participant is focally aware of what they are 
expected to do, various possibilities exist: They might 
act in line with the perceived demand, they might show 
no effect, or they might even show the opposite 
tendency, depending on their own motivations and 
inferences (Weber & Cook, 1972).  In either case, the 
resulting response is very different from the one they 
would naturally exhibit as long as they remain naïve to 
the study purpose.  Thus, instead of second-guessing 
their intentions it is therefore standard practice to 
exclude participants who are aware of key aspects of the 
experimental design (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Page, 
1973).  
In light of what is known about the social dynamics 
of experimental situations we can evaluate the crux of 
the argument put forward by Durgin et al. (2009, p. 
965): “If a physical burden, such as a heavy backpack, is 
sufficient to alter slope perception, it ought to do so even 
if participants believe that the backpack is an incidental 
part of the experimental apparatus.” Precisely herein lies 
the most critical error of argument, because the research 
documenting misattribution effects has indeed shown 
that previously observed effects should go away under 
certain conditions:  Once participants are aware of 
essential parts of an experimental set-up, either because 
they inferred what they believe to be the experimenter’s 
intention, or because the experimental protocol involves 
making a source of influence salient, they deliberately 
give very different responses from the ones they would 
provide while remaining unaware of purpose and 
procedures.  Such processes of attribution and 
misattribution have been extensively documented in a 
literature spanning the last fifty years or so, as will be 
discussed next.  
 
Attribution, Misattribution and Judgment 
The beginning of misattribution research is generally 
considered to be marked by Schachter and Singer’s 
(1962) classic experiment.  They injected participants 
with epinephrine, a substance leading to physiological 
arousal, or a placebo.  Some participants were then given 
the correct information about arousal symptoms 
following the injection, namely a pounding heart and the 
possibility of the face getting hot and flushed.  In 
contrast, other participants were misinformed and told 
they might experience epinephrine-irrelevant symptoms, 
such as itchiness or a headache.  Yet another group was 
not given any information about what kinds of 
symptoms to expect.  While waiting with a confederate 
who either acted in an angry or euphoric manner, 
participants who had no prior expectation about the 
effects of the drug were more likely to experience the 
same emotion as the confederate: because they had no 
good explanation for being aroused, they inferred that 
they must be feeling either euphoric, or angry, as well.  
Importantly, however, this effect was not observed for 
participants who had previously been told that they 
might experience arousal-like symptoms:  They did not 
show any influence of the confederate’s behavior on 
their own mood because they were able to correctly 
attribute their arousal to the drug rather than considering 
it informative when making sense of their feelings.  
Thus, the main finding of this experiment was that 
induced arousal was interpreted based on the 
information available in one’s immediate context.  
However, this was only the case as long as participants 
had no other explanation available for their current 
physical state.  Building on this early work, many 
studies have shown that emotions can be changed when 
a physiological state is misattributed to an emotionally 
irrelevant source (for a review, see Cotton, 1981).  
Misattribution processes can also lead to seemingly 
surprising effects. For example, Younger and Doob 
(1978) showed that when unfairly provoked a placebo 
pill said to be relaxing made participants more 
aggressive than a placebo pill said to be arousing:  
Participants who were experiencing high arousal while 
expecting to be relaxed by the pill unconsciously 
concluded that they must be especially angry and 
aroused, relative to those who could misattribute their 
arousal to the pill.  Thus, people make sense of their 
internal sensations by looking for reasons for those 
sensations; they are considered meaningful if 
experienced in the context of appropriate situational 
cues, but discounted if salient alternative explanations 
call into question the informativeness of those sensations 
for the judgment at hand.   
In the context of perception, a preliminary finding 
suggests that participants find a hill to be more steep 
when they were misinformed that they had received 
glucose, when in fact they had received a sugar-free 
drink (Williams, Ciborowski, & Durgin, 2012):  A 
feeling that the hill is challenging and steep despite the 
belief that they should feel energized by the drink leads 
to the inference that the hill must be especially steep.  
Indeed, such counterintuitive “reverse” placebo effects 
have been documented in many contexts (Barefoot & 
Girodo, 1972; Brodt & Zimbardo, 1981; Ross & Olson, 
1981; Schwarz, Servay & Kumpf, 1985; Storms & 
Nisbett, 1970).  
Overall there is an extensive literature of attribution 
effects showing that people often infer their own feelings 
from various environmental cues.  This, however, is not 
a conscious, deliberate process; in fact, once people 
become aware of the real underlying sources and 
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reasons, their inferences and responses change 
accordingly.  Schachter and Singer (1962) recognized 
early on that their “conclusions are generalizable to 
almost any pronounced internal state for which no 
appropriate explanation is given” (p. 397, emphasis 
added).  Going beyond how people make sense of their 
emotions, this notion of attribution and misattribution 
has been applied to informative cues within all kinds of 
judgments contexts.  
Much of this work is based on a seminal paper by 
Schwarz and Clore (1983; see also Schwarz & Clore, 
2003), in which they examined the role of mood on 
judgments of life satisfaction.  In one experiment 
participants were led to believe that their answers would 
contribute to the construction of a Life Event Inventory 
because it involved giving detailed descriptions of a 
happy or sad experience in their recent past.  In reality 
this procedure served to induce a happy mood, or a sad 
mood.  In the second experiment a similar mood 
induction was accomplished by testing participants on a 
nice and sunny, or a cold and rainy day.  Somewhat 
unsurprisingly, when asked about their quality of life as 
a whole, both experiments showed that participants in 
happy moods gave higher ratings of life satisfaction than 
participants in sad moods.   
More importantly in the current context, however, the 
experiments also involved attribution manipulations that 
made salient a plausible alternative cause of participants’ 
feelings:  The first experiment was conducted in an 
unusual sound-proofed room covered in insulation and 
electrical shielding.  The oddness of the room was 
pointed out directly to participants in a cover story 
suggesting that spending time in the room might make 
them feel tense, or instead, relaxed.  In the second 
experiment, a phone survey, the interviewer pretended to 
be calling from a different city to have a reason for 
asking some of the participants about the weather in 
their city on that day.  The intention of this seemingly 
casual remark was to make obvious the likely actual 
cause for their feelings, namely the weather. In an even 
more blatant version of this misattribution manipulation 
participants were told that the researchers were 
“interested in how the weather affects people’s mood 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983, p. 519).”  Both experiments 
showed that the effects of mood on judgments of life 
satisfaction disappeared once participants were provided 
with a potential alternative reason for their mood, 
namely the sound-proofed room in the first study, or the 
sunny or rainy weather in the second study.  
Interestingly, when participants were asked about their 
mood at the end of the study, having been reminded or 
not of the external influence did not make a difference.  
Stated differently, participants’ subjective feelings 
remained the same, but what changed was the relevance 
of these feelings to the judgment:  When seemingly 
linked to the odd room or the lousy weather, participants 
implicitly took into account that negative feelings were 
no longer informative regarding the judgment of 
satisfaction with their lives as a whole.  
Similar attribution processes take place in the context 
of metacognitive feelings that are experienced as 
relevant in various judgment contexts (for reviews, see 
Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz, 2012).  For 
example, participants interpret perceptual fluency in 
recognition tasks as indicative of familiarity.  If a target 
word is preceded by the same word that is flashed very 
briefly outside of conscious awareness, participants are 
more likely to mistake the word itself as a previously 
encountered word, and therefore say they “recognize” it 
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989).  This effect, however, 
disappears when the duration of the word is increased so 
that participants become conscious of the priming.  
These findings and many others (e.g., Bernstein & 
Welch, 1991; Gellatly, Banton, & Woods, 1995; 
Joordens & Merikle, 1992; Westerman, 2001) suggest 
that when people make recognition judgments and 
decide whether they had previously seen a stimulus, they 
use the ease with which the item comes to mind as a cue 
to its familiarity.  Again, however, this only works as 
long as the relevance of this cue is not called into 
question by becoming salient, in which case people 
actively disregard it.  
All this evidence suggests that people’s judgments, 
whether affective, cognitive, or perceptual, are 
influenced by various factors that carry informative 
meaning:  Good moods indicate a positive state of the 
world, bad moods indicate a negative state of the world.  
A feeling of familiarity indicates one has previously seen 
a stimulus, a lack of familiarity indicates that it is novel.  
Similarly, physical capabilities and associated resources 
indicate that actions in the environment would be easy to 
accomplish, whereas experienced effort and a lack of 
resources suggests the opposite.  All these are 
functionally adaptive considerations:  It is useful to be 
cautious about one’s environment, for example, when a 
feeling of fear suggests danger, or a sense of effort 
suggests that climbing up a hill would be challenging, 
and therefore, should be reconsidered.  However, people 
are highly capable of recognizing that such feelings may 
be inappropriate in situations where the sources of these 
feelings is made salient, and as a consequence, they 
correct their judgments.  
 
Attributional Processes Versus Experimental 
Demand Characteristics 
Methods used to study attribution and misattribution 
can be subtle, such as merely asking casually “By the 
way, how is the weather down there? (p. 519)”, or more 
blatant, such as explicitly saying that the study 
investigates the influence of the weather on people’s 
9 
mood; both types of manipulations had the same effect 
in Schwarz and Clore (1983).  An even more blatant 
manipulation was used by Durgin and colleagues (2009).  
They ensured that the presence and purpose of the 
backpack was salient, by attaching real electrodes to 
participants and connecting them to the backpack.  To 
further draw attention to this aspect of the study an 
electric fan inside the backpack produced noise and 
various pieces of additional equipment were prominently 
on display in the lab.  Therefore what Durgin and 
colleagues (2009) labelled the “low demand” condition 
was practically identical to the manipulations used in 
countless misattribution studies.  Similarly, in an effort 
to “reduce the experimental demand of wearing a heavy 
backpack” (p. 1584), Durgin et al. (2012) conducted a 
further study that again made the presence of the 
backpack salient, this time by asking participants to 
ignore its influence on their judgments:  
In a previous experiment we found that if we asked people 
to wear a backpack they nearly all assumed that we 
intended the backpack to affect their judgments.  Since 
most subjects want to be cooperative, many of them altered 
their estimates to try to help us out. We are trying to find 
out if there is a way to make people just report what they 
see rather than trying to be compliant with what they think 
we want them to say. As far as we know, wearing a heavy 
backpack does not affect your visual system, so please 
simply estimate the slope of the hill. That is, make the best 
estimate you can based only on what you see (p. 1585). 
Again the original effect was replicated without such 
instructions, but it disappeared for participants who were 
giving the misattribution instructions.  The experiment 
further used a glucose manipulation, and administered a 
drink either containing sugar or not, as previously used 
by Schnall et al. (2010).  In their most direct test of the 
glucose hypothesis in Study 1, Schnall et al. (2010) had 
established that participants were unable to tell whether 
the drink contained sugar or not, and therefore were 
blind to the manipulation involving a black-currant-
flavored juice drink.  Using Coke and Diet Coke as in 
Schnall et al. (2010, Study 2), Durgin et al. (2012) took 
into account whether participants said they were able to 
taste whether the drink contained sugar or not1.  
Participants who could not tell what was in the drink 
gave lower slant estimates when they had received sugar, 
compared to participants who had not received sugar, 
thus replicating the finding by Schnall et al. (2010).  
Thus, as long as participants were blind to condition and 
giving intuitive perceptual judgments, participants in 
Durgin et al.’s (2012) experiment estimated the hill to be 
less steep after having consumed sugar compared to after 
having consumed sweetener. However, and consistent 
with the misattribution logic outlined above, once 
participants’ attention was drawn to the fact that there 
are other factors that might be influencing their 
perception because they were reminded of the presence 
of the backpack, this effect was no longer present.  A 
subsequent study by Cole and Balcetis (2013) with a 
larger sample used a double-blind design and replicated 
the glucose effect with distance perception while 
participants were unable to correctly identify whether the 
drink contained sugar, and their accuracy of guessing 
sugar content did not predict the effect of the 
manipulation. 
In the context of attribution and misattribution 
processes we can reconsider the finding of a backpack 
manipulation that involved making half of the 
participants aware of the backpack (Durgin et al., 2012).  
All participants were asked to give two estimates, one 
while at the hill and another later while back in the lab.  
Only participants whose attention had not previously 
been drawn to the presence of the backpack revised their 
second responses to be lower than their initial estimates.  
It is likely that participants who were already focally 
aware of the presence of the backpack had stripped their 
judgment of all possible extraneous influences 
(“remember, the backpack should not influence your 
judgment”):  They had already corrected their judgment, 
and their estimates were consequently relatively low.  
The only group that had not given extensive thought of 
how they arrived at the judgment was the group that was 
not yet focally aware of the backpack.  Once it was made 
highly salient by having been asked various questions 
concerning the study, including whether the backpack 
had affected their judgments, they were practically in the 
same situation as the participants who were reminded of 
the backpack right from the start, and indeed, their slant 
estimates were identical.  
Using a similar approach, Firestone and Scholl 
(2014) first replicated Stefanucci and Geuss’s (2009) 
finding that an aperture looks more narrow to 
participants holding a rod horizontally across their body, 
which would make moving through difficult.  Once 
again, after explicitly drawing participants’ attention to 
the presence of the rod by telling them that it was 
intended to improve their balance, after “the 
experimenter also pretended to carefully choose the rod 
from a salient array of differently sized rods in the room, 
and it was explained that the researchers were testing 
poles of different sizes (p. 44),” the original effect was 
eliminated.  The fact that the initially observed effects 
disappear or are altered is to be expected given the 
extensive literature on judgment processes studied 
within social psychology.  The fundamental distinction 
is between what has been called ‘experimental demand 
characteristics’ (Orne, 1962), and ‘attribution’ and 
‘misattribution’ (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  The 
former refers to participants trying to figure out the goal 
of the experiment, and acting accordingly, whereas the 
latter refers to people implicitly taking into account 
various influences on their judgments, and once such 
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influences are considered incidental and no longer 
informative, to appropriately correct for them.  
 
Moving Forward: Taking Into Account the Social 
and Contextual Constraints of Perceptual Judgments 
 Although it has been demanded for future research to 
clearly delineate perception and judgement as separate 
processes (Firestone & Scholl, in press), the research 
reviewed in the current paper suggests that arriving at 
such a separation is not feasible. Nevertheless, research 
can be conducted that takes into account the insights 
from work on judgment processes, in particular, 
pragmatic rules of communication. Indeed, because 
experiments follow the same rules as other 
conversational contexts (Schwarz, 1996), instructions 
need to be given that take into account the specific social 
context and what participants might infer beyond what is 
explicitly stated. It is impossible to eliminate demand 
characteristics (Orne, 1962), so studies introducing 
elaborate instructions, such as reasons for experimental 
procedures, may create more problems than they can 
solve.  Participants cannot provide an unmediated 
experience, but only a reported sense of what they 
perceive, based on a variety of cues that they implicitly 
take into account, while ruling out information that 
might be considered irrelevant, or potentially 
confounding their judgment.   
 How can researchers fully capture the nature of 
perceptual experiences, which often take into account 
input about the actor’s bodily capabilities, goals and 
other action-relevant considerations?  When asking 
research participants to give estimates about size, slant, 
distance and various other perceptual properties, care 
needs to be taken to take into account well-established 
processes in social judgment and decision making 
contexts. Importantly, studies need to be designed such 
that they minimize the potential of participants guessing 
the true purpose of the research.  Many such studies 
have already been conducted, and their results cannot be 
explained by demand characteristics or other artifacts.  
Indeed, despite their critiques none of the skeptics (e.g., 
Durgin et al., 2009; 2012; Firestone, 2013; Firestone & 
Scholl, in press) have put forward any alternative 
theoretical account that could explain those findings, 
which come in two forms: First, studies that measure 
individual differences and relate them to perceptual 
outcomes, and second, studies for which the objective is 
difficult or impossible to discern by participants because 
the experiment involves non-obvious manipulations and 
predictions.   
 
Individual Differences and Perception. Early 
findings suggested that elderly or fatigued participants 
find hills to be steeper than young or rested participants 
(Proffitt et al., 1995; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999).  Many 
additional related findings have been obtained (e.g., 
Proffitt, 2013).  For example, participants with wide 
shoulders find the apertures of hallways to be smaller 
than participants with narrow shoulders (Stefanucci & 
Geuss, 2009).  Similarly, women perceive staircases to 
be steeper than men, presumably due to lower physical 
strength relative to body mass (Taylor-Covill & Eves, 
2013). Overweight people see hills as steeper than 
people of a normal weight, but losing weight as part of a 
weight loss program makes hills appear less steep 
(Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2015). Evidence also suggests 
that individual differences with respect to people’s social 
roles in relationships with others influence perception. 
Lee and Schnall (2014) found that a low sense of social 
power, defined as experiencing a general lack of control 
over one’s own and others’ resources, is associated with 
increased perceptions of weight when lifting a heavy 
box.  Thus, both stable physical characteristics and 
personality-based individual differences have reliably 
been found to influence the perception of the physical 
world. 
   
Non-Transparent or Counterintuitive Predictions.  
Getting directly at energetic concerns underlying 
perception, the glucose finding first obtained by Schnall 
et al. (2010) has been extended to a distance perception 
paradigm in which both experimenter and participants 
were blind to the glucose and placebo conditions (Cole 
& Balcetis, 2013).  Furthermore, people who are 
presumed to be low on glucose because they actively 
select high-energy food and drink when given a choice, 
estimate hills to be steeper than people who select low-
energy alternatives (Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2014). 
Beyond glucose, when energy expenditure associated 
with walking was manipulated on treadmill walking, 
distances were estimated as farther under conditions that 
required high volumes of oxygen (White, Shockley, & 
Riley, 2013).  
 In addition, recent work has used manipulations for 
which it has previously been shown that participants 
cannot infer the study hypothesis (e.g., Cacioppo, 
Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 
2010; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Huang, Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011).  For example, Lee and 
Schnall (2014) employed a posture manipulation that 
ostensibly involved testing the comfort of an economic 
office chair, while in reality it induced either a powerful, 
or a powerless posture.  Post-experimental questioning 
indicated that participants were unaware of this 
intention, just as in previous research using this method 
(Carney et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2011).  Participants 
who were induced to feel powerless estimated the weight 
of boxes filled with books to be greater than participants 
who felt powerful, or were in a neutral condition (Lee & 
Schnall, 2014).   
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 Similarly, while participants were making hill slant 
estimates, we manipulated approach and avoidance 
orientation in non-transparent ways (Krpan & Schnall, 
2014a).  In one study participants pressed against a step-
ladder either by flexing the arm, therefore producing the 
motor behavior of approach, or extending the arm, 
therefore producing avoidance (cf. Cacioppo et al., 
1993).  In another study participants completed a paper-
and-pencil maze task by either helping a mouse at the 
center to find the way out to reach a cheese, or help the 
mouse to escape from an owl, which has been shown to 
induce approach or avoidance, respectively (Friedman & 
Förster, 2001).  For both types of approach motivation 
participants estimated the hill to be steeper than for 
avoidance motivation, or a control condition, but this 
effect was moderated by participants’ physical condition 
on that day, with only relatively fit participants showing 
the effect.  Thus, in the face of approaching a steep, 
challenging hill, perception serves to discourage 
impending action when it may be costly, but only for 
participants for whom undertaking this action is a 
realistic possibility.  Furthermore, consistent with the 
misattribution logic, when instructing participants in the 
approach condition that they would definitely not have 
to climb up the hill, the effect disappeared (Krpan & 
Schnall, 2014a).  Again, this effect was only obtained for 
participants for whom climbing the steep hill was 
feasible in the first place because they were relatively fit. 
That is, similar to the effects documented by Durgin and 
colleagues (2009; 2012), once the implied meaning of 
the approach cue was called into question, it no longer 
provided informative input in the context of perception.  
Importantly, when questioned afterwards not a single 
participant was able to correctly identify what the 
manipulations intended, much less formulate the 
hypothesis that approach should lead to higher estimates 
compared to the avoidance or control conditions.  
Similarly, approach and avoidance behaviors 
consistently influence distance estimates to valenced 
objects while participants are completely unaware of 
experimental predictions (Krpan & Schnall, 2014b).   
 
Convergence between Perception and Action. As 
has been argued for other areas of psychology (e.g., 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007), self-reports provide 
only one way of capturing experience.  Indeed, to get a 
more comprehensive understanding of what factors 
influence perception, appropriate behavioral measures 
should be used.  In particular, the core claim of the 
economy of action account is that environments that are 
effortful to traverse involve perceptual estimates that 
discourage subsequent action (Proffitt, 2006; Schnall et 
al., 2010).  For example, the assumption of findings such 
as reduced fitness being associated with increased slant 
estimates is that it occurs because unfit people are less 
able to climb a hill than their fit counterparts (Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999). A critical question therefore is whether 
perception indeed shapes behavior, for example, such 
that people with certain physical characteristics are more 
or less likely to engage in corresponding actions.   
An extensive review of 43 studies examined the 
likelihood of people using stairs or escalators as a 
function of effort-related considerations (Eves, 2014).  
As would be predicted from the economy of action 
account, people for whom taking the stairs would be 
challenging, namely women, the elderly, those carrying 
more weight in the form of body fat or heavy shopping 
bags chose to take escalators adjacent to stairs more 
often than their not-so challenged counterparts.  
Importantly, this involved naturally occurring behavior 
in urban environments such as shopping malls and train 
stations, and the relevant studies were observational, 
allowing no scope for experimental demand.  Related 
research more directly showed that in the face of inclines 
people indeed act in ways that are consistent with the 
ways in which they see them: People who avoided stairs 
and chose an escalator instead reported them to be 
steeper than people who had chosen to climb the stairs 
(Eves, Thorpe, Lewis & Taylor-Covill, 2014). Overall, 
there is now a considerable body of evidence for which 
results cannot be explained by experimental demand 
characteristics, and in the absence of any viable 
alternatives the only parsimonious account currently 




 Findings supporting an embodied account of 
perception have been criticized for entailing demand 
characteristics.  However, support for interpretations 
relating to demand characteristics has relied on 
manipulations that are based on the assumption that once 
participants are given appropriate instructions, their 
“true” perceptual processes can be separated from 
experimental demand or inferential judgment processes. 
Such an assumption is inappropriate given people’s 
inability to introspect on the reasons behind their 
judgments. Further, perceptual judgments have to be 
considered within well-established pragmatic and 
conversational rules of making sense of questions in 
given social contexts.  Finally, given what is known 
about attribution and misattribution processes, the 
findings that are interpreted to show experimental 
demand in fact reflect well-established phenomena in 
judgments processes: Like other judgments, perceptual 
judgments take into account contextual and experiential 
factors.  Importantly, the precise manner in which such 
factors influence perception depends on their perceived 
informational value.  In most everyday situations, people 
use whatever information they experience as relevant in 
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a judgment context and they therefore incorporate it.  
However, making people aware of the incidental nature 
of such experiences undermines their informational 
value and elicits correction.  A full appreciation of the 
social constraints on perceptual judgment therefore 
reveals that perceptual processes function in much the 
same manner as other processes involving subjective 
feeling and judgment:  They take place outside of 
people’s conscious awareness and serve adaptive 
functions because they reflect action-relevant 
circumstances in the social and physical worlds.   
 
Footnote 
1 The single experiment reported in Durgin et al. (2012) 
involved 37 participants.  In addition to assigning them 
to four experimental conditions, participants were split 
into whether they reported to taste the presence of sugar 
in the drink or not.  These analyses involving taste are 
therefore based on very small sample sizes, with an 
average of 4.63 participants in each of eight conditions.  
Findings involving such few participants need to be 
considered with caution; nevertheless they are discussed 
at face value in the current paper.   
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